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“Working informally means that you don’t
have the help of a company behind you. I’d have
liked a formal job, but this was the best I could
do.” These are the words 75-year-old Eva Her-
nandez said to BBC News in Bogotá, Colom-
bia, during her daily work of selling newspapers
that she is unable to read. While walking the
streets of Bogotá, we could not go more than
a few feet without being bombarded by street
vendors, pitching everything from wooden
maracas to hand-woven purses to fried
empanadas, as they tried to make a coveted sale.
These workers are a part of the majority of
Colombian citizens who are members of the
informal economy, an economy devoid of many
of the social benefits and protections of the
formal economy. While Colombia as a whole is
seeing positive economic indicators in the form
of healthy GDP growth and low inflation, work-
ers in the informal sector must deal with the
typically lower earnings and instability that
accompany jobs outside the reach of the formal
economy. With income inequality and poverty
levels continuing to be major issues within
Colombia, looking more deeply into the work-
ings of the informal sector—how it emerged,
why it persists, and what impact it has on the
economy as a whole—will help Colombia solve
some of the economic and social issues that
have plagued it for decades.
Defining the Informal Economy
No study of the informal economy can
begin without defining what constitutes the
informal economy. For the sake of this arti-
cle, the informal economy consists of economic
activities that lie outside governmental regu-
lations and, therefore, exclude workers from the
protective benefits of formal employment.
People working in the informal sector do not
pay taxes, do not pay for or receive social secu-
rity benefits, and do not have protections from
unemployment or sickness. As of 2010, the
informal economy houses 60 percent of the
Colombian workforce (Mance), creating major
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problems in terms of the sustainability and
effectiveness of many social programs that the
government tries to implement: too few peo-
ple pay into the systems to keep them afloat; the
people in greatest need of the benefits often
do not have access to them; and most people
who work in the informal economy have diffi-
culty escaping it. By exploring why the informal
economy is harmful to Colombia, how it pro-
gressed to its present state, and what policies
have been used in the past, this article addresses
what policies might be most effective in helping
Colombia combat the problems of its informal
economy today.
Shortcomings of the Informal
Economy
As a provider of work and income to peo-
ple who need it the most, the informal economy
does not, at first glance, seem like a problem-
atic institution. However, a large informal econ-
omy can cripple an economy and stagnate social
programs instituted by the government. An
economy that lies beyond the control of a gov-
ernment or regulatory agency lacks vital protec-
tion for workers and provides a lower standard
of living than formal employment. Informal
workers must cope with irregular days of work,
the lack of a minimum wage, an absence of
health or safety standards, no contract enforce-
ment, and exclusion from social security or pen-
sion plans. At the other end of the spectrum, a
large informal economy seizes a portion of
income that could be included in a country’s
GDP and allocated to social programs that are
in great demand in developing countries like
Colombia. Although an informal sector may
be beneficial in the short run in providing
immediate employment, it is not conducive to
long-term growth. Moreover, it does not provide
sustainable funding for social security or poverty
reduction programs put in place by the govern-
ment, often leading to decreased services and
benefits of such programs. As citizens and busi-
nesses begin to lose confidence in the govern-
ment’s ability to provide economic and social
stability, they see less of a need to pay taxes or
support subpar social programs (“Removing
Barriers . . . ,” pp. 4–5). This vicious cycle lim-
its the government’s ability to enact the appro-
priate reforms or to act as a positive agent of
change, one of its most important roles. For
developing countries around the world hoping
to alleviate poverty conditions and advance their
economies, the informal sector has been a fac-
tor they have had to address for many years.
Modern Emergence of the Informal
Sector
The informal sector is not new. It has
existed around the world for centuries in rural
areas as people often worked and lived their lives
with little government interference in the form
of taxes or social programs. The modern urban
informal economy, which is the focus of this
article, came about after World War II as many
countries looked to modernize and enter the
industrial age. Although many today do not
see the informal sector as contemporary, the
term, informal sector, and its study did not orig-
inate officially until 1972 when the International
Labour Organization (ILO) began to study urban
labor markets in Ghana (Losby et al., p. 2).
Before this time, the informal sector or, more
precisely, the economic activities it encom-
passed, was seen as a temporary phenomenon
that would gradually disappear as a more formal
economy took root. Experts hoped, and
expected, to build up the economies of develop-
ing nations in the same way they rebuilt the
economies of Europe and Japan after World War
II. The ILO and other organizations believed
that no matter what a country’s political lean-
ing (socialistic, democratic, etc.), with the right
macroeconomic tools and funding, economic
development could be achieved and informal
jobs would be swallowed up by the formal econ-
omy. As is now evident, however, the informal
sector was not a passing trend. Economies sim-
ply did not grow quickly enough to handle the
increased demands of people who wanted mod-
ern, urban jobs. When workers had no formal
job opportunities available to them, they turned
to whatever form of work they could find (Ban-
gasser, pp. 3–4). This was the beginning of the
modern era of the urban informal sector.
Colombia followed a trend similar to that
of the rest of the world. Like some other Latin
American countries, the proportion of the
population of Colombia that was urban grew
rapidly, from 31 percent in 1951 to 52 percent
in 1964 alone, as the country went through
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the process of modernization. In addition, the
immense bloodshed of La Violencia1 during the
1940s and 1950s forced approximately one
million Colombians to move from violent rural
areas into bigger cities (Flórez, 2003, p. 3).
Although employment generation in cities
should have been a main focus during this time,
the thinking of the 1960s favored export promo-
tion and capital formation instead, under the
assumption that employment would grow as a
result. It was not until the ILO conference in
1972 that the urban informal economy came
onto center stage, gaining real prominence in
the 1980s when it became one of the five “global
themes” of the ILO’s Medium Term Plan (Ban-
gasser, pp. 5–13). The urban informal econ-
omy would remain an important issue in
Colombia from the 1990s to the early 2000s, due
to an escalation in violence that caused approx-
imately two million people to be forcibly dis-
placed from their homes in the countryside to
urban areas. The number of workers in urban
areas, along with the economic crises of the
1980s and 1990s, grew at such a rate that the
economy could not respond rapidly enough.
As a result, the supply of workers outpaced
demand, and the informal economy grew to the
level in evidence today.
Heterogeneity of the Informal Sector 
While the informal economy encompasses
a majority of the workforce in Colombia, not all
of these workers are in the informal sector for
the same reason. According to Guillermo Perry
and William Maloney (p. 1), informal workers
fall into two main groups: (1) workers who are
excluded from the formal sector and (2) entre-
preneurs who choose to exit the formal sector
because it is of greater benefit to them. Each
of these groups contains several different mem-
bers who are in the informal sector for a host of
different reasons. The excluded workers cate-
gory—those who prefer to be formal employees
but are hired as informal workers—includes
anyone from employees of informal businesses
to informal subcontractors within a formal sec-
tor firm. Those who choose to avoid the for-
mal sector—to avoid paying taxes and the has-
sle of registering a formal business—range from
small business owners to street vendors (Chen,
pp. 2–3). The diversity of the informal economy
and the variety of people it contains make it dif-
ficult for any government or organization to
tackle the informal sector as a single entity. 
Colombian Political Reform:
1990–2002
Prior to 1990, labor laws in Colombia were
not conducive to growth in the formal sector.
Although the laws were established with the
good intentions of protecting workers and
providing job stability, they caused many ineffi-
ciencies within the economy that hindered job
creation. Hiring and firing regulations were
among the most detrimental instruments put
in place under these laws. In addition to estab-
lishing a strict “just cause” clause that made
releasing workers difficult, the law raised sever-
ance payments to such a level that they became
the highest nonwage labor costs of the period
(Echeverry and Santa Maria, p. 5). Although cur-
rent employees held on to their jobs, firms were
hesitant to hire additional employees in eco-
nomic upturns due to the added costs for each
employee. Even if firms wanted to hire new
employees, the minimum duration of a formal
contract was one year. Without being able to
legally hire temporary workers, firms turned
to informal contracts or simply chose not to hire
at all. A study sponsored by the Inter-Ameri-
can Development Bank estimated that the strin-
gent hiring and firing laws before 1990 actually
increased the unemployment rate by 10 percent
and also increased the length of informal
employment among low-skilled workers and the
young (Kugler and Cardenas). Although the law
was based on good intentions, it ultimately
did not help those it most needed to reach:
unemployed workers hoping to escape the infor-
mal economy. By helping those currently
employed in the formal sector, the gap widened
between the insiders—formal employees—
and the informal employees kept on the outside.
Due to increased unemployment and
informality, labor reform became a top prior-
ity in Colombia, as legislators introduced the
Labor Reform Policy of 1990. The reform looked
to increase flexibility and efficiency in the
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1La Violencia was a decade-long civil war between the
Colombian Conservative Party and the Colombian Liberal
Party that cost the lives of more than 200,000 people.
Colombian labor market by reducing severance
payments, expanding the definition of just
causes for firing, and introducing temporary
contracts (Flórez, 2002, p. 4). By allowing for
more movement in the labor market and
increased opportunities for entrance into the
formal sector, it is clear this reform was geared
toward helping informal workers at the expense
of formal sector jobs. The reforms appear to
have been successful, even at a limited level.
Employment in the informal sector dropped
by 2.5 percent from 1990 to 1994, and unem-
ployment fell by a total of 4 percent, with labor
reform directly contributing to a drop in unem-
ployment of 0.4 percent (Echeverry and Santa
Maria, p. 10). These numbers may seem insignif-
icant, but, given the short period of time and the
failure of the labor market in years past, they
indicate the benefits of increased flexibility
within the labor market for workers in the infor-
mal sector.
Although informal employment started to
shrink at the beginning of the 1990s, a wave
of social reforms swept through all of Latin
America, including Colombia. In 1993, with the
hopes of reducing inequality and improving
health services, Colombia passed Law 100, a law
that radically changed the public health and
social security systems. In terms of health-
care, Law 100 increased contributions to the
public healthcare system by formal employees
from 6 percent (of their earnings) under the 
old system to 12 percent in the new system (8
percent paid by the employer and 4 percent from
the employee). Poor individuals and the unem-
ployed are enrolled in the welfare system but do
not have to pay into it. In terms of pension
reform, Law 100 more than doubled required
contributions for salaried employees from 6.5
percent to 13.5 percent of their earnings. In
total, the new law increased healthcare and
social security contributions from 12.5 per-
cent to 25.5 percent (12 percent for health con-
tributions and 13.5 percent for pensions), mak-
ing each worker significantly more expensive to
hire (Flórez, 2002, pp. 5–6).
The impact of Law 100 was felt by firms in
the formal sector, but entrepreneurs and the
self-employed were hit even harder. Even
though formal sector employees have to pay a
greater percentage of their wages toward health-
care and pensions, a portion of their contribu-
tion is covered by employers. Entrepreneurs, on
the other hand, must cover all of the costs on
their own: an increase from 12.5 percent to 25.5
percent. These new changes make formal
employment much less attractive to self-
employed individuals in the informal sector who
can obtain equal benefits in the informal sec-
tor—due to universal healthcare—without hav-
ing to contribute a portion of their incomes to
the systems. As such, the Colombian social pro-
tection system established under Law 100 actu-
ally promotes informal employment for sev-
eral reasons: (1) a substantial percentage of
the population would receive equal benefits
whether in the contributing or subsidized
group, so many opt for the free-of-charge sub-
sidized group; (2) workers cannot easily trans-
fer between groups, making them hesitant to
accept a job offer that would put them in the
contributing group; and (3) poor workers in the
subsidized group are often eligible for more 
benefits and, therefore, do not want to lose
any benefits by taking a job in the formal sector
and joining the contributing group (Mon-
dragón-Vélez et al., p. 11). When the Colombian
government passed Law 100, it was hoping to
improve the livelihood of its citizens and
increase social welfare; unfortunately, this
resulted in an increased incentive to join the
informal economy. 
With the effects of Law 100 lingering and
the unemployment rate reaching historic highs
of approximately 20 percent, the economic
situation in Colombia at the end of the 1990s
was anything but ideal. According to the Depar-
tamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística
(DANE) (“Measurement . . .”), Colombia’s
national statistics agency, Colombia’s GDP
shrunk by 4.3 percent in 1999 compared with
a 0.18 percent annual growth in GDP for Latin
America, while the urban unemployment rate
reached 20.5 percent in September 2000 com-
pared with a 10.7 percent average unemploy-
ment rate in Latin America as a whole. Policy-
makers recognized that lowering the level of
unemployment was to be a top priority, but
labor market rigidities and high nonwage costs
prevented them from making the necessary
changes. It was clear that another reform
needed to take place. Under the leadership of
newly elected president Juan Uribe, Colombia
passed the Labor Reform Policy of 2002 that had
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the following provisions: (1) it reduced parafis-
cal2 taxes from 8 percent to 5 percent of payroll,
directly reducing nonwage costs; (2) it intro-
duced an apprenticeship contract to allow for
additional forms of hiring; (3) it introduced a
regular working shift to eliminate extra pay-
ments for night shifts, Sunday work, and holi-
day work (as long as an alternate day of rest is
provided); and (4) it established that work
done outside of the regular working shift would
be compensated with double wages or a com-
pensating day of rest, unlike previous labor laws
that had required both forms of compensation
(Echeverry and Santa Maria, pp. 15–16). Thus,
the 2002 reform increased labor flexibility and
provided employers with more hiring options
and incentives, all in the hope of decreasing
unemployment and the number of informal
workers.
The impact of the 2002 reform is diffi-
cult to measure and to disentangle from other
macroeconomic policies; although unemploy-
ment clearly decreased after 2002 (a trend
similar to that in other Latin American coun-
tries), GDP also rose over the same period and
may have contributed to the positive results.
However, most experts agree the reform had
at least some positive impact. Alejandro Gaviria,
a Colombian economist and development spe-
cialist, concluded the law had an especially ben-
eficial impact on the hiring of apprentices—
which grew 89 percent from 2002 to 2003
alone—and did indeed lower unemployment.
However, growth in employment in the formal
economy was less than expected, and some
workers in the service sector saw a considerable
reduction in income from the reform. Jairo
Núñez, an economist involved in shaping the
reform, found a more positive impact of the
reform, noting that work in the formal sector
increased 6 percent from 2002 to 2004 and
that those in the greatest need—youth and
the less educated—benefited the most from the
reform (“Reforming Labor Law . . . ,” p. 4).
From an examination of the last 25 years
of labor and social reform in Colombia, it is clear
that improving flexibility in the labor market
and incentivizing firms in the formal sector to
hire new workers has proved successful in
increasing the number of formal sector jobs.
What is also clear is the substantial positive
impact that new policies can have on the scope
and magnitude of the informal sector. To help
craft productive reforms for the future, Colom-
bians should look not only at what has worked
for their country in the past but also at other
initiatives used around the world that have pro-
duced positive results. 
Learning from the Peruvian
Experiment
One of the most attractive models for
reducing the size of the informal sector hails
from one of Colombia’s Latin America neigh-
bors, Peru. In the 1980s, Hernando de Soto
headed the Institute for Liberty and Democracy
(ILD) in the study of informal street vendors
in Lima, Peru, in an attempt to solve the prob-
lem of informal employment among the many
entrepreneurs around the city. By focusing on
lowering the barriers to formalization, cutting
the costs to businesses of regulation, and involv-
ing everyday citizens in the process, the ILD saw
dramatic success in reducing the number of
informal businesses. For example (Bettcher 
et al.),
• 382,100 Peruvian businesses were for-
malized in only three years.
• 200 informal market places in Lima
were formalized by 2008.
• Businesses saved $692.5 million in red
tape.
• 550,000 jobs within the formal sector
were created.
• Land values doubled in the newly for-
malized markets.
• Major urban neighborhoods were revi-
talized.
De Soto and the ILD were able to turn the
shacks and shanty shops that lined neighbor-
hood streets around Lima into productive busi-
nesses in only a few short years by recogniz-
ing a key idea: instead of continually trying to
combat the informal economy with more reg-
ulations and restrictions, the government
should do all it can to make formalization eas-
ier. By simplifying the number of steps required
to start a business, eliminating unnecessary red
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2In Colombia, payroll taxes that help finance public
social services—such as the Instituto Colombiano de
Bienestar Familiar and the Servicio Nacional de Apren-
dizaje—are locally referred to as parafiscales or parafiscal
taxes.
tape, and educating street vendors on effective
managerial practices, the path to formaliza-
tion became easier than ever before. 
In order for the ILD to work effectively, the
organization needed the support of a willing
government. Congress passed an Administrative
Simplification Law,3 created a Unified Busi-
ness Registry,4 and established a Property For-
malization Law,5 all within only three years
under the guidance of the ILD. The government
also made sure to involve citizens in the reform
process, asking them for their input and even
hosting television sessions with the President of
Peru. By involving citizens and playing an active
role, the government succeeded in educating
the people about the new changes as well as
establishing credibility in its ability to run an
effective economy. The move paid off not only
for newly formalized businesses but also for the
government, with tax revenues increasing by
$1.2 billion from 1991 to 1994 (Bettcher et
al.). All in all, the reforms generated remarkable
job growth, increased entrepreneurship, built
up entire neighborhoods, and boosted the
morale and livelihood of the poor. 
Peru’s growth as a developing nation in
Latin America is an encouraging sign that
inroads can be made in reducing the informal
sector in Colombia. De Soto and the ILD recog-
nized that the informal economy is fueled by
excessive regulations and bureaucratic complex-
ities in starting or maintaining a business; when
these obstacles were lessened, the switch from
the informal to formal sector escalated. Colom-
bia saw similar success when it reduced labor
market rigidities in its own country, both with
informal entrepreneurs and formal firms.
Aiding Entrepreneurs: Reducing
Barriers to Formalization
As the Peruvian experiment demonstrates,
reducing barriers to formalization for infor-
mal entrepreneurs can have a substantial effect
on decreasing the size of the informal sector. By
simplifying bureaucratic procedures, Peruvian
policymakers were able to help formalize thou-
sands of businesses, create hundreds of thou-
sands of formal jobs, and reduce business start-
up costs by millions of dollars, all in a span of
less than five years. Colombia would benefit
from the same policies. According to the World
Bank’s “Doing Business 2013,” Colombia is
ranked 45th in the world with respect to its ease
of starting a business; while it is fourth in Latin
America, it still ranks far below the United
States—which is ranked fourth in the world—
and other developed countries.
As countries make the process of start-
ing a business easier, they can directly increase
the number of formal sector jobs by incen-
tivizing informal firms to register their busi-
nesses. For example, Vietnam introduced its
Enterprise Law in 2000 that streamlined the
process of starting a business: it decreased the
costs of starting a business. It reduced the num-
ber of required licenses and permits and cut the
estimated time to start a business from 98
days to 7. According to estimates, 40 percent
of newly registered firms after the implementa-
tion of the law had previously operated in the
informal economy (Garcia-Bolivar). El Salvador
followed suit in the early 2000s by creating “one-
stop-shops” for formalization. These shops help
businesses with the registration process, enter
all their information—such as products offered,
geographic location, production capacity, etc.—
into a database, and then find procurement
opportunities with other businesses within
the system. This not only allows small busi-
nesses to establish themselves but also provides
them additional help to stay competitive (Gar-
cia-Bolivar).
Colombian policymakers have certainly
made it easier to start a business in Colombia
over the past decade by decreasing the num-
ber of bureaucratic procedures and days
required to start a business. Businesses can now
expect only 8 procedures taking 13 days to start
a business, rather than the 19 procedures and
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3Passed in 1989, the Administrative Simplification
Law sought to simplify transactions between the govern-
ment and businesses. It simplified over 400 administra-
tive procedures, reducing costs in time and paperwork, and
was primarily aimed at helping poor citizens in areas
such as business, education, and housing.
4Created by the government in 1990, the Unified
Business Registry consolidated procedures from many dif-
ferent agencies into one central location, greatly reducing
the time and resources required to nationally register a busi-
ness.
5Passed in 1988, the Property Formalization Law sim-
plified the formalization process for extralegal real estate
(properties not registered with the government), created
a property registry, and created procedures for handling 
disputes.
60 days that were required in 2004 (“Custom
Query . . .”). However, one of the biggest remain-
ing barriers to formalization is educating the
public. No matter how easy or appealing the for-
malization process may be, if citizens do not
understand the process they will not readily join
the formal sector. By involving citizens in the
process through a democratic discussion of
the mechanisms and regulations involved with
formalization, de Soto and his team were able
to increase participation in the Peruvian formal
economy simply by raising awareness. Colom-
bia could benefit from a similar process in which
government officials are open to ideas, criti-
cisms, and discussions with citizens working
within the informal economy. This would cre-
ate feelings of trust in the government and its
policies, feelings that are often lacking in citi-
zens within the informal sector. 
Formal Firms: Establish Flexible
Labor Laws
In addition to decreasing barriers to for-
malization, policymakers must continue to pro-
mote flexible labor laws in order to encourage
the hiring process within formal firms. Colom-
bian history has shown that strict labor laws are
not conducive to job growth in the formal sec-
tor. Figure 1 demonstrates the varying size of
the Colombian urban informal sector from 1985
to 2007, a period when many reforms took place.
As discussed previously, in 1990 Colombia
implemented its first major reform of the labor
market, making hiring and firing easier for
firms and allowing for greater efficiency in the
market. This reform caused the overall contri-
bution of informal businesses to Colombia’s
GDP to drop 2.5 percent in only four years,
going from 47.5 percent of Colombia’s GDP in
1990 to 45 percent in 1994. However, in 1993
Colombia instituted social reforms with the
passing of Law 100, the law that greatly
increased contributions to social security and
public healthcare from both the employer and
employee. By the time the law was fully in place
in 1996, the contribution of informal businesses
to Colombia’s GDP jumped from 45 percent in
1994 to 54 percent in 1996. The dramatic
increase should not be entirely linked to Law
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Figure 1
Size of the Colombian Urban Informal Sector
Sources: Echeverry and Santa Maria; Flórez, 2002; “Measurement of Informal Employment.”
100, for Colombia was in the midst of an eco-
nomic crisis at this time; but the burdensome
policies put in place by the law caused firms to
be even more reluctant to hire new workers.
With the economic crisis lingering, poli-
cymakers used a tool from the past and
reformed the labor market once again with
the Labor Reform Law of 2002. As described pre-
viously, the law increased labor flexibility and
decreased nonwage costs. As a result, the con-
tribution of informal businesses to Colombia’s
GDP dropped from 61.5 percent of the Colom-
bian economy in 2002 to 60 percent in 2003.
Although this is only a modest decrease, given
the short time frame and the continued decline
in the size of the informal sector in the years
to follow, the numbers provide further evidence
of the positive impact of the law on the informal
sector. Altogether the results indicate that the
informal sector is best reduced with flexible
labor laws that allow formal firms to adapt to
changing market conditions efficiently.
Although social reforms seem like a great idea
on the surface, they often hurt informal work-
ers, the people they are trying to help most,
more than any other group. Increases in parafis-
cal taxes and increased worker protection ben-
efit workers who are already in the formal econ-
omy, but they also cause firms to be more
hesitant to hire new employees. The result is
usually an increase in unemployment and an
increase in the size of the informal sector. 
A Holistic Approach: Increase
Incentives for Formalization
Any political or social approach aimed at
decreasing the size of the informal sector ulti-
mately needs to create more incentives for work-
ers and businesses to be involved in the formal
economy. Entrepreneurs, formal firms, and
informal workers remain in the informal sec-
tor mostly because it is economically advanta-
geous for them to do so. From a microeco-
nomics standpoint, the benefits simply outweigh
the costs. There are several ways that Colombian
policymakers can increase incentives for formal-
ization, each directed toward the major groups
involved in the informal sector. For example,
many entrepreneurs in small enterprises are hes-
itant to enter the formal sector because of tax
reasons. To combat this problem, Brazil and
other Latin American countries have created a
single levied tax on revenues for small enter-
prises that replaced one or more of the follow-
ing: the value-added tax, social security tax,
and income tax. Brazil estimated that these
enterprises enjoyed significant tax savings and
created 500,000 new jobs in the formal sector as
a result (“Removing Barriers . . . ,” p. 31). By sim-
ply decreasing the costs of being in the formal
sector, small firms were incentivized to for-
malize, and the economy benefited as a result.
Formal firms would respond in a similar
fashion. As evidenced from the introduction of
flexible labor laws, these firms are more will-
ing to hire workers when the costs they would
incur decrease. A firm has no incentive to for-
mally hire workers when its financial liabili-
ties increase substantially; it is more convenient
and cheaper to simply hire them off the books.
Policymakers need to take an active hand not
only by establishing incentives for formaliza-
tion—for example, by creating tax breaks for
firms that add formal workers to the payroll—
but also by educating firms about the benefits
of full formalization. The U.S. Agency for Inter-
national Development insists that more dia-
logue between government officials and the pri-
vate sector is one of the best long-term
initiatives for reducing the size of the infor-
mal sector. By showing firms the costs of the
informal economy, what they can specifically do
to help combat it, and how the long-term ben-
efits of growing the tax base outweigh the short-
term monetary gains from hiding informal
activities, a government can actively pave the
way toward greater formalization and a reduc-
tion in the informal economy (“Removing
Barriers . . . ,” pp. 36–39). Whether creating
tax incentives for formalization, providing more
health or pension benefits to formal employees,
offering more business services to formalized
firms, or offering several other initiatives, as the
benefits of being in a formal economy start to
outweigh the costs, people will begin the shift
toward formalization. As this happens the infor-
mal economy will begin to shrink as well.
Conclusion
The intricacies and complexities of the
urban informal economy have beleaguered
Colombian policymakers and workers for
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decades as they strive to pull their country
out of poverty and toward a brighter future. The
informal economy in Colombia continues to
promote income inequality, prevents the poor-
est groups from obtaining social services, and
keeps the country from realizing its full eco-
nomic potential. Although Colombia has expe-
rienced significant macroeconomic growth in
the last decade, the majority of its workforce still
remains in the informal economy. This means
that the bulk of Colombia’s economy is unac-
counted for: it is not factored into the nation’s
GDP nor does it help support the government
or its programs. By reducing barriers to formal-
ization, establishing flexible labor laws, and
increasing incentives within the formal econ-
omy, Colombia could begin the transition to
an economy composed primarily of formal
firms. 
During the Martindale Center Student
Associates’ visit to Colombia in the spring 
of 2012, the streets of Cartagena and Bogotá
were lined with these informal workers—sell-
ers of produce, purses, necklaces, chotchkes,
drinks, and paintings—all hoping to make a liv-
ing for themselves in whatever way they can.
What if these workers were incorporated into
a viable, working economy? Such an economy
would allow them to receive a pension, have
greater access to credit to grow their business,
and benefit from worker protection rights. Help-
ing people obtain this status in the formal econ-
omy should be a top priority of Colombian
policymakers; it is essential for reducing poverty
and increasing economic development. The
Santos administration has successfully worked
at establishing a more peaceful, economically
sound Colombia thus far, but the informal
sector continues to be a concern. After we met
with top Colombian officials and businessmen
in Bogotá, it became clear that the country
has the ability to reduce the informal sector.
Growing the oil industry, attracting foreign
investors, and favoring big business all appear
to be lucrative options for the country. However,
if Colombian policymakers choose to use the
country’s healthy GDP growth and favorable
macroeconomic policies to instead change the
makeup of their economy, Colombia could see
a majority of its workforce within the formal
sector and improve the livelihood of its citizens.
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